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“Political Settlements” for “Increased Resili-
ence”: The Changing International Discourse 
on Peace Processes 
Jan Pospisil 
 
At the latest since the publications of the UN Secretary-General on 
“Strengthening the role of mediation” (UNSG 2012) and the recent OECD 
guidelines “Improving International Support to Peace Processes: The Missing 
Peace”, published by the International Network on Conflict and Fragility, 
INCAF (OECD 2012a), the issues of peace processes and peace agreements 
have once again returned prominently to the international agenda. These re-
cent documents not only propose new and different avenues and approaches 
to analysing, accompanying and mediating peace negotiations. Moreover, 
they highlight the concept of “political settlements” in processes of peace ne-
gotiation. Thus, these documents are (re-)connecting the debate on peace-
building with the concepts of state fragility and resilience, and the respective 
components of the so-called “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States”, 
which was agreed upon at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, held 
in Busan, South Korea in November 2011. 
In the following, the process that led to these recent documents will be ex-
plored by considering three questions: firstly, what is the history of this new 
emphasis on peace processes, institutionally as well as concerning the narra-
tive which has accompanied this new focus? Where does it come from, and 
for what reasons did it re-emerge? Secondly, which new components, dimen-
sions and approaches, as different from the established ideas about peace ne-
gotiations and peace processes, can be identified in the discussions on “polit-
ical settlements”? And finally, what are the implications on the ground? Is 
there already a change in the international involvement in peace processes, 
and whether this is the case or not, what can be expected in the near future?  
The following sections will offer an initial, if brief and fragmentary answer to 
each of these questions. In the conclusion, a rendering of particular policy 
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trends in the wider context of the transformation of international power con-
stellations will be suggested. 
The renewed emphasis on peacebuilding 
While most of the scholars and practitioners involved in the work on or in 
fragile situations would agree that “statebuilding” and “peacebuilding” are 
the most important tasks to be faced in such efforts, they almost certainly 
would disagree on what both terms exactly mean, either conceptually or in 
terms of which concrete methods and measures they should be translated in-
to. This seems rather reasonable: as broad, encompassing and overlapping as 
both of these terms are, they represent different approaches for local as well 
as international actors (Paris/Sisk 2009: 14). Both approaches are linked with 
different academic and policy communities and have different historic tradi-
tions. 
“Peacebuilding” was the predominant way to deal with violent conflicts in 
the period between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s. The term is closely in-
terlinked with the concept of “conflict prevention”. The 2001 OECD DAC 
paper named “Helping Prevent Violent Conflict” (OECD 2001) marks the 
climax of this period. Most of the contemporary approaches developed in re-
sponse to the then emerging field of the development-security-nexus are to be 
found within this document, of which a whole chapter is designated to the 
issue of “peace processes, justice and reconciliation” (ibid: 51-60). In con-
trast, issues regarding “statebuilding” are merely of minor relevance: the 
main reference to statehood is in the chapter on “partnerships for peace”, 
where issues of weak governance are highlighted (ibid: 61-62). The all-
encompassing phrases of “state failure” (only to be found in quotations) and 
“state fragility” (not present at all in the document) are merely of minor sig-
nificance.  
This relation between “peacebuilding” and “statebuilding” was turned upside 
down in the following years. “Failed states” (and statebuilding as the appro-
priate answer to it) were on the rise from the early 2000s onwards (cf. Paris 
2004), and made their way into most of the relevant security doctrines of the 
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time (cf. The White House 2002, which included the famous quote that 
“America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing 
ones”, or EU 2003). At present, statebuilding still represents the main con-
cept of international intervention in what is now called “fragile situations”, 
and is accompanied by a wide variety of international policy documents such 
as the “Fragile States Principles” by the OECD DAC (2007).  
Such a domination of statehood-focused thinking increasingly led to doubts 
and scepticism, particularly from the peacebuilding policy community. Thus, 
departing from the insight that “the relationship between peacebuilding and 
statebuilding is complicated, contingent and context-dependent” (Call 2008: 
3), various initiatives were launched to re-link both approaches. Perhaps the 
most important of those initiatives is the “International Dialogue on Peace-
building and Statebuilding” (IDPS), established in 2008 and located at the 
OECD DAC. The IDPS was created as a forum of exchange between the 
OECD countries, civil society organizations and the so-called “fragile states” 
themselves (the latter mainly represented by the so-called g7+ group), with 
the aim of discussing the experiences and good practices, but also the diffi-
culties and constraints of peace- and statebuilding activities. One of the main 
topics that evolved in these discussions was not surprisingly the issue of the 
linkage between state- and peacebuilding.  
One of the main achievements of the IDPS to date is the so-called “Monrovia 
Roadmap on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding” from July 2011, which laid 
the foundation for all the fragility and peacebuilding debates at the 2011 High 
Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan. The Monrovia Roadmap is the 
first official policy document that links the discourse on state fragility and 
resilience with peacebuilding. It does so by putting the emphasis on issues 
like state-society relations and political legitimacy (OECD 2011). Thus, the 
“growing convergence” between these two fields, which has been increasing-
ly highlighted as being indispensable (Haider 2010: 5, cf. also World Bank 
2011: 85), was introduced to the official, bilateral development discourse. 
This would not have been possible without the dynamics unleashed by the 
g7+ group. The g7+ was established mainly as a result of the efforts made by 
Emilia Pires, the Minister of Finance of Timor Leste. The group currently has 
19 member states, all perceived as highly fragile (and representing regional 
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contexts as diverse as Afghanistan and the Solomon Islands). The g7+ had its 
inaugural meeting in the course of an IDPS meeting in Dili, Timor Leste, and 
has been one of the main actors within the IDPS ever since. Consequently, 
the g7+ has been able to get involved in key aid policy debates such as in the 
G20 and the High Level Forum in Busan in November 2011. In Busan, the 
group emerged as the key stakeholder in the development and presentation of 
a “New Deal for International Engagement in Fragile States” (IDPS 2011), 
which endorses the approaches of the Monrovia Roadmap at the international 
level. 
While this New Deal does not contain anything significantly new compared 
to the Monrovia Roadmap or other documents published by the IDPS, it still 
represents a major step forward. For the first time, peacebuilding and 
statebuilding are not only accepted as the most important challenges in situa-
tions of violent conflict and fragility, but it is also recognized that both ap-
proaches have to be actively brought together (in particular via the so called 
“Peacebuilding and Statebuilding Goals”, or PSGs, which are yet to be 
agreed upon). The second important contribution of the New Deal is that for 
the first time in formal OECD documents the development partners are play-
ing on an equal playing field with the donor countries. This is of course due 
to a reciprocal interest at the diplomatic level: donors are aiming to create 
additional ownership on their side, while g7+ members are interested in con-
structing the image of a reliable and acceptable partner. Nevertheless, this 
marks a shift within the power distribution in the international development 
and security discourse.  
Additionally, the New Deal was the main political cause for a change in the 
discourse at the policy level, in particular in the discussions about peace-
building within the framework of the International Network on Conflict and 
Fragility (INCAF) at the OECD DAC. Since the mid-2000s, the debate at 
INCAF focused on “state fragility”, its reasons and possible methods for po-
tentially fruitful intervention. Moreover, connected with the g7+ engagement, 
the peacebuilding topic is re-emerging, taking up several of the points raised 
in the fragility-debate (in particular the emphasis on state-society relations 
and “resilience”), and is framing all this in the term “peace settlements”. 
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Although these developments are highly significant in the peacebuilding de-
bate, it has to be taken into account that this process has been mainly on the 
bilateral (and also on the civil society) level. Discussions on the multilateral 
level have taken a somewhat different route. This is particularly true for the 
United Nations. For the UN, state failure has never been a particularly im-
portant topic, at least in explicit terms, most probably due to the sovereignty 
paradigm on which the whole UN system is based. Therefore, peacebuilding 
and peace mediation have remained far higher on the agenda compared with 
the bilateral sphere. 
Settlements instead of treaties: changing patterns in the interna-
tional debate  
Along with such dissimilarity between the bilateral and the multilateral lev-
els, the focus and the main issues of the respective debates also differ. The 
debate within the UN primarily focuses on mediation. This is of course close-
ly connected with the installation of the UN Mediation Support Unit in 2006, 
and the necessary guidance that this Unit has needed since. Still, the UN has 
recognized significant changes in the sphere of peacebuilding, such as the 
fact that the “field of mediation has become more diverse and crowded” 
(UNSG 2012: 6). Furthermore, the international community is requested to 
act more patiently and discreetly, and is urged not to declare “the failure of 
mediation efforts when immediate results are not delivered” (UNSG 2012: 5-
6). 
The current OECD discourse follows a similar path. The basic assumption 
that foreign intervention – be it by diplomatic pressure, military means, or 
through developmental support – could actively create or even “make” peace 
has been finally dismissed. Instead, the focus is on political settlements, the 
question of “ripeness” (regarded as a necessary precondition for the owner-
ship of the conflicting parties) and state-society relations. These terms are 
closely linked to the debate on state fragility and resilience at the INCAF. 
Such similarity might be caused by the fact that the main papers informing 
the debates have been elaborated by the same LSE scholars, primarily James 
Putzel and Jonathan Di John, who have also been responsible for designing 
Jan Pospisil 
88 
the fragility-resilience discourse in the context of statebuilding (cf. OECD 
2011c: 21-22). 
Di John and Putzel (2009) in particular argue for utilizing Political Economy 
Analysis in analyzing political settlements, focusing on elite bargains, rights 
and entitlements and the specific historic context in which these processes are 
taking place. Hence, their suggestions very much resemble other recent 
approaches to peripheral political spheres, such as the political marketplace 
approach of Alex De Waal (2009a, 2009b), and dynamic, society-centred ap-
proaches as Joel Migdal’s (2001) “state-in-society approach” or the concept 
of “negotiated statehood” (Hagmann/Péclard 2010). Accordingly, it is obvi-
ous that the question of the structure of such political settlements takes centre 
stage in the actual implementation as well. 
The OECD policy papers therefore argue for a “changing toolkit” of interna-
tional engagement in peace processes (OECD 2012: 42), with the main em-
phasis not put on fulfilling an agreement point for point, but on keeping vio-
lence out of the post-agreement process and to guarantee the continuation of 
the transformation of the conflict and, consequently, peacebuilding. Since 
political settlements per se are based on certain power struggles, it is neces-
sary for all involved actors to accept the post-agreement struggles, see them 
as necessary and, in most of the cases, as given. However, the focus should 
be to ensure that these struggles remain peaceful. 
Besides focusing on the long term arrangements that will be negotiated after 
an agreement is in place, it is furthermore necessary to avoid falling into the 
trap of technocracy: “Peace agreements should place more emphasis on 
breaking the structures for violence than conventional Disarmament, Demo-
bilization and Reintegration, Security System Reform and small arms reduc-
tion efforts” (OECD 2012: 21). Of course, all these steps have their legiti-
mate place in post-conflict peacebuilding; nevertheless they are neither a lit-
mus test (at least not in most cases) nor magic bullets. DDR or SSR processes 
enforced with neither the consent nor the ownership of all the involved par-
ties – just because they are agreed upon in a peace deal – will most likely not 
help create a resilient settlement, but rather undermine any serious develop-
ments in that direction. 
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The departure from the focus on signed agreements and the paradigm of 
stronger state institutionalization in its aftermath marks an important step, 
which has already been undertaken in the statebuilding debate. In this con-
text, the two antipodes of “fragility” and “resilience” are understood as a par-
ticular kind of capacity (or lack thereof) in dealing with internal and external 
pressures: “More resilient states (...) are capable of absorbing shocks and 
transforming and channelling radical change or challenges while maintaining 
political stability and preventing violence” (OECD 2011c: 21). 
Bringing these general assumptions to the peacebuilding level entails various 
consequences that go beyond a simple change in the “toolkit”. It not only re-
quires strategic thinking and acting in the sense of what has been coined a 
“whole-of-transformation” approach to peacebuilding (Dudouet et al. 2012: 
262), which aims to bring all relevant actors and structures together. It fur-
thermore requires a new level of participation deliberation, up to the point at 
which the traditional label of “spoilers” – designating those who explicitly 
aim to spoil a peace process – will lose any kind of meaning, since “spoilers” 
in the context of a political settlement are none other than those left out, in-
tentionally or unintentionally, hence making the settlement almost by defini-
tion neither inclusive nor resilient. 
Implications for current processes 
Given that we are dealing with very recent developments on the policy level, 
it comes as no surprise that empirical research on the practical implications of 
the new peacebuilding discourse “on the ground” is as yet non-existent. The 
OECD (2012: 73-84) of course points to the fact that some of the most active 
donors in this particular field take the new approach seriously; additionally, it 
has identified their respective omissions. Still, it is safe to say that the impli-
cations of the changing approach remain to be seen. 
Nevertheless, there are remarkable trends that demonstrate the relevance of 
the main arguments put forward in the course of the debate. For instance, the 
current peace process between the Colombian government and the left-wing 
FARC guerrilla is rather prototypical for such a new agenda. Both parties 
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have acknowledged in explicit terms the ripeness of the state of conflict for a 
new negotiation process, and they have set their agenda and designed the 
whole negotiation framework with minimal international involvement. Even 
though international locations are used for the negotiations (Oslo and  
Havana) and four countries are involved as guarantors and observers (besides 
Norway and Cuba Venezuela and Chile), there are no international mediators, 
no international pressure, and, most importantly, no international road-maps, 
concepts or the like. 
Other negotiation processes like the ones concerning Sudan/South Sudan and 
Mali indeed demonstrate a higher level of international engagement, but – 
from a historical perspective – a comparatively high level of ownership and, 
above all, a regional leadership of the meditation process. The success is 
mixed, but the trend is obvious and accepted by most actors. Nevertheless, 
the current situation in Syria apparently demonstrates the exact opposite and 
exemplifies the old method of trying to force peace through diplomatic 
means, international, UN-led mediation and, if half-heartedly, military 
threats. While, of course, this is not the reason for the continuous failure of 
pacifying the Syrian conflict (which most probably might have more to do 
with the particular, obviously misbalanced political setting and the lacking 
ripeness for a transformation of the conflict), it demonstrates rather clearly 
the inefficacy of such a traditionalist peacebuilding approach. 
The case of Syria demonstrates that it will be a massive task to implement the 
guiding principles of the new peacebuilding approach. Besides the usual 
complications every policy concept has to face on the long road to its appli-
cation, this is caused by the, however implicit, challenge these approaches 
represent to concepts such as democratic peace or the ideal of a global law 
and justice regime, in particular regarding international criminal law. As has 
been shown, the concept of political settlements rests very much on processes 
of political accommodation (cf. Migdal 2001: 58-94), and such processes 
rarely correlate to the visions, agendas or at times even the minimum stand-
ards of most of the international actors. Approaches such as “Good Enough 
Governance” (Grindle 2004) try to take up this challenge and to translate it 
into a language acceptable to the international community, but still remain 
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within a discourse that is very much based upon notions of statehood as rele-
vant for the OECD world. 
This opens up the more general question as to what international intervention 
and support is able to accomplish in peacebuilding, and, consequently, what 
it could or should do. The trend of the international debate regarding peace-
building, but also regarding statebuilding, reveals that the times of excessive 
optimism seem to be over. Instead, the regional and local levels in peace-
building are gaining significantly in importance, while the role of the tradi-
tional international players in peacebuilding is tending to return to acting as 
guarantors of regionally or locally negotiated and implemented solutions. 
Such solutions have the potential to become a huge and complex challenge, 
particularly in situations where they do not fit into the internationally accept-
ed perception of common sense. 
Conclusions 
Despite the lack of its implementation in currently ongoing peace processes, 
the current peacebuilding debate, which has brought the issue of peace pro-
cesses back to the international spotlight, must be assessed positively. Signif-
icantly, the debate restricts, at least in theory, the proliferation of external 
mediation actors, a process about which even the UN was highly sceptical. In 
turn, the problem of context is brought to the fore, feasible (“good enough”) 
solutions are explicitly preferred to idealized ones, and, in any case an essen-
tial step, the limitations of the possibilities of external actors in the context of 
peace processes are acknowledged. 
This shift in the approach to peace processes is the policy outcome of an aca-
demic debate that has its roots in the mid-1990s. The re-packaging of the ver-
satile and contiguous concepts and notions about the causes of violent con-
flict after the end of the Cold War – the “New Wars”, ethnic or ethno-
political conflicts, the question of greed versus grievance, and the “Failed 
States” – in the concept of “Fragility” demonstrates a new international un-
derstanding of violent conflict and thus opens up a highly innovative range of 
solutions. Consequently, the focus of implementation is now shifting from 
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the level of peace agreements to the much more general level of political set-
tlements. 
In more general terms, this shift also implies a new role for society and the 
conflicting parties. This finds its expression not only in the emphasis on 
“context”, but also in the usage of the – admittedly problematic – term “ripe-
ness”. On the other hand, the role of international actors, including the lead-
ing global powers, is necessarily limited. However, their potential (as it is 
expressed for example in the idea of sanctions regimes) is probably histori-
cally overrated anyway. It is perhaps the most important achievement of the 
current debate to explicitly admit these limitations. 
 
This paper was produced in the context of the research project “Dynam-
ics of Peace Processes in Violent Conflicts with Multiple Actors”, locat-
ed at the oiip and funded by the Jubiläumsfonds of the Oesterreichische 
Nationalbank. 
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